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Summary 
This project utilizes panel data for 70 coal enterprises of Kuzbas region that 
were fully established and operated continuously between 1996 and 1998, and finds 
empirical evidence that negative supply shocks, liquidity problems in the region, 
efficiency of coal enterprises, and specific features of external opportunities in labor 
markets influence the occurrences of wage arrears. This work draws several major 
conclusions for Kuzbas region: (1) wage arrears have negative relation to demand for 
the output of the enterprise and are sensitive to efficiency of the enterprise, which is 
measured through profit/loss variable; (2) high regional average for wage arrears 
increases the probability that wage underpayments in a particular enterprise in this 
region have chronic nature; (3) the firms making a decision to withhold wages are 
taking into account the volume of sales and wage levels in the enterprise in previous 
periods. Also the form of ownership exerts the influence on the decision delay 
payments.  
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1. The Issue  
Wage arrears are one of insidious responses of the Russian labor market to the 
process of economic transition. Seemingly, they are caused by the collapse of the 
fiscal system, gradually acquiring chronic nature and becoming a characteristic 
feature of regional economy. Wage arrears are an essential factor exacerbating social 
conflicts as they cut real incomes of certain population groups and increase the 
already high wage polarization in Russia (Lehmann, Wadsworth and Yemtsov, 2000). 
The most conspicuous is the relationship between the growth in wage arrears and 
social tensions in Kuzbas. Workers’ strikes in this coal region caused by wage non-
payment have become a pressing political factor over the years of reforms. 
It so happened historically that in Russia over a half of coal output is 
generated in Siberia, just in Kuzbas region. In preparation of decisions about coal 
sector reform the voice of regional bosses is well audible. They use wage arrears and 
stemming social tensions as an argument to get government subsidies, budgetary 
financing and investment loans. In this context the problem of wage arrears incidence 
has a special weight. 
The discussion of issues related to non-payments to employees often turns into 
propaganda of interests of various political and lobbyist groups. Because of this 
political setting, an analysis of the nature of wage arrears becomes of particular 
importance. 
Researchers who analyze the problem of arrears note that first occurrences of 
this problem were observed in 1994. According to the data of Goskomstat of Russia 
(http://www.info.gks.ru), wage arrears in Russian economy as a whole were 
increasing between 1994 and 1999. In October of 1998 growth rates of the aggregated 
indicator for wage arrears went down compared to the previous month. In August of 
1999 the aggregated indicator decreased in absolute value from the level of the 
previous month. In January of 2000 the total wage arrears amounted to 31 690 million 
roubles. Evidently, the situation with wage arrears improved in the last two years, and 
this improvement is related to the post-crisis revival of Russian economy. 
In the meantime, mechanisms that caused large-scale growth of wage arrears 
in response to demand shocks continue to exist even in the relatively improved 
economic conditions. Decreased growth rates of gross output in the first quarter of 
2001 were accompanied by a 2.5 % growth in the aggregated indicator for wage 
arrears (compared to the same period in 2000).  
Studies that examine wage arrears stress that the problem of wholesale non-
payments to employees is specific to Russian economy when in other transitional 
economies wage arrears not widely spread and incident firms in bankruptcy (Earl and 
Sabirianova, 1998). Alfandari and Schaffer (1996) analyze the problem of debts of 
Russian enterprises and note that the overdue amounts to government budgets, 
financial institutions and trade (inter-enterprise) credit in Russia are comparable to the 
level of similar debts in other transitional economies, while wage arrears in Russia are 
of extraordinary scale.  
This peculiar feature of economic transition in Russia can probably be 
attributed to the existence of two factors – on the one hand, underdevelopment of 
regional labor markets, and, on the other hand, inertia of large enterprises, which were 
created as part of the centralized scheme of production location and regional 
specialization. This type of enterprises has most difficulties in adjustment to demand 
limitations that accompany crises of transitional periods. Several studies of the 
problem of arrears confirm that this type of enterprises withhold payments to their 
employees more frequently than other types of enterprises.  
A portrait enterprise been employment in this one should be in arrears has 
already been drawn: it is large and old in terms of its foundation date (Earle and 
Sabirianova, 1998), located in provincial region (Lehmann et al, 1999, Alfandari and 
Schaffer, 1996), it belongs to a base industry such as resource extraction and 
manufacturing of industrial goods, and is owned by federal government (Lehmann et 
al, 1999).  
The object of analysis in this study will be Siberian coal mining enterprises. 
They possess all the characteristic features listed above and represent typical wage 
non-payers. 
The majority of studies that deal with arrears is based on the analysis of the 
behavior of individuals. The approach in these studies is to examine the probability 
for an employee not to receive his or her wage on time and to establish factors that 
affect this probability – individual characteristics of the employee, characteristics of 
the enterprise and regional factors. (Earle and Sabirianova,1 998, Lehmann et al, 
1999, Desai and Idson, 1998).  
The study by Gilles Alfandari and Mark E. Schaffer (1996) conducts an 
analysis of wage arrears as behavior of enterprises. This paper examines wage arrears 
along with other arrears of an enterprise and draws the conclusion that wage arrears, 
as opposed to tax arrears, are not associated with financially distressed enterprises. 
Our study is based on the ideas proposed in previous studies of wage arrears. 
At the same time it is different from studies of labor markets because it analyzes the 
behavior of enterprises. In other words, this paper addresses the question: Why do 
enterprises withhold wage payments? At the same time this paper does not attempt to 
answer the question: Why do employees agree not to receive wages?  
In the most general form, the objective of this paper is to establish reasons for 
wage arrears in coal enterprises by using empirical data on the performance of Kuzbas 
mines and quarries. To answer this question, we must identify the determinants of 
wage arrears and the directions in which reductions in demand, the problem of 
underpayments, institutional factors and external employment opportunities influence 
the incidence of debts. 
2. Problem Background  
The Influence of the Government 
In the minds of both regional leaders and miners wage arrears are caused by 
government policy in this industry. The main feature of this policy is government 
subsidies. These subsidies include: 
- measures on closing unprofitable mines; 
- service benefits to surplus workers; 
- safety measures in coal-mining ; 
- selective support of loss-making enterprises; 
- implementation of tariff agreements. 
Since 1997 the proportion of funds assigned by the state to implementation of 
tariff agreements has markedly decreased (Table A.3, Appendix  A). 
Tariff agreement is the share of work remuneration that is guaranteed by the 
state (in 1999 this share stood on average at 30 % of the total wage fund). The tariff 
agreement between Trade Unions (on behalf of employees), MinTopEnergo (on 
behalf of employers) 1 and Ministry of Labor and Social Protection (on behalf of the 
state) is to be renewed every year. The subsidy within the tariff agreement is given per 
one ton of planned coal output, and output in excess of the planned level is not taken 
                                                          
1 The “Association of Coal Producers”  in the first tariff agreement of 1999. 
into consideration. According to the law, the amount of resources designated within 
the tariff agreement does not depend on the share of government ownership of the 
enterprise. However, the analysis of funds assignation schedule in the first half of 
1999 shows that there are some firms left without state support. Also, the tariff 
contract includes a system of bonuses tied to firm’s performance. 
An important factor for wage arrears is adherence to financing schedule. 
Irregular financing of tariff agreements caused an increase of strikes in 1996-97. The 
fundamental demand of strikers was and remains to be payment of wage arrears.  
The government learned its lesson from the conflicts. With the general 
reduction of budget financing, the amount of government funds designated for tariff 
agreements decreased. In addition, starting from 1998, a new scheme of budgetary 
financing of coal industry was introduced. Any recipient – a coal company, a mine to 
be closed, administration of a mining community – can now get its subsidies only on 
the basis of agreements confirmed by Russian MinTopEnergo (Ministry of Fuel and 
Energy). Subsidies as well as severance benefits to surplus workers are sent through 
channels of state treasury to their individual recipients.  
The analysis of database of coal enterprises of Kuzbas for 1998 shows that 
non-payments from budgets of all levels are insignificant in the structure of wage 
arrears (Table 4, Appendix A).  
Organizational Forms of the Industry and Privatization Policy 
Coal industry was one of the earliest to enter the process of reformation, which 
is still underway. The brief story of these reforms is as follows. 
After the strikes that took place in 1989-1991, mines, quarries and auxiliary 
enterprises were the first ones in the country to be reorganized to joint-stock 
companies, withdrawn from state control and given juridical status. Typically, 
associations of enterprises were transformed to “soft” holdings that had no effective 
instruments of management. Mines, although legally in state ownership, were actually 
controlled by their directors. This market began to be filled with a vast number of 
businessmen often mixed up with criminal groups. 
In 1993 the government decided to liberalize (deregulate) prices for the 
products of coal enterprises, and coal enterprises immediately began to suffer liquidity 
problems. 
In 1996 it became quite clear that to solve this problem mines and quarries 
should become industrial units of strong market agents, that is, competitive coal 
companies set up on the basis of old associations of enterprises. In 1993 the total coal 
output was produced by 262 individual mines, and in 1998 74 % of coal was produced 
by 30 regional coal companies2. No unprofitable or unpromising mines were included 
in the formation of these companies, and the government took on itself obligations 
connected with the closures.  
Active privatization policy is taking place in the industry today. As a result of 
this policy, the government intends to sell control of the majority coal enterprises in 
Kuzbas. 
At the same time, the government will preserve the right to interfere into the 
activities of coal enterprises through the institution of “golden stocks.” At present the 
question of transferring control over the “golden stocks” to regional management is 
being heavily debated in different government structures and regional press.  
The necessity of government support for coal industry, which is related to a 
complex of problems in Russian economy, results in a situation where coal enterprises 
are incapable of conducting independent economic policy even after privatization and 
                                                          
2 National average if not specified otherwise 
are involved in various vertical management structures. For example, regional 
structures substitute organizations such as “Rosugol,” which was eliminated by 
federal decree. Without doubt, this process affects economic behavior of enterprises 
as a whole, and the situation with wage arrears, in particular.  
Demand for the Output of Coal Industry  
 In 1998 coal production saw a growth brought about, in our opinion, by 
growing domestic demand, and this tendency continues. Besides, the scenario of 
Russian short-term Energy Strategy that is now being considered suggests an 
increased share of coal in the national fuel balance. Cheaper and more easily obtained 
coal will be substituted for natural gas due to increasing natural gas prices and 
changing price proportions between fuel oil, gas and coal used in the generation of 
energy and heat. In consequence, the upward trend for coal demand indicates not only 
recovery from depression but a long-term tendency of coal prevalence in fuel balances 
of Russian regions. The market of Kuzbas coals extends to Siberia, Ural, and 
European part of the country. Variegated quality of Kuzbas coals ensures a wide 
range of its consumers. 
Demand for Kuzbaz coal is not monopolized by one consumer or a group of 
consumers. This circumstance makes the market for coal competitive and transparent, 
which presents a factor for growth in efficiency for Kuzbas coal enterprises. 
Economic Indicators of Coal Industry 
It might sound like a paradox, but growth in coal demand does not solve 
financial problems of coal enterprises. The current situation in the industry has been 
called “difficult” (Astakhov, 2001). Monetary (as opposed to barter and offsets) 
payments of electric power generating plants remain at the level of 16-18 %. Tax 
arrears and other underpayments into non-budget funds are 4-13 times more than 
receivables. Average industry wage arrears to coal miners constitute approximately 
four months of wages.  
An analysis of a selected group of enterprises that amount to 96 % of coal 
extraction in Kuzbas reveals that credit arrears per employee grew significantly (see 
Appendix A4) along with an increase in output sales (shipped output). At the same 
time there exist some positive tendencies: the number of profit-making enterprises 
increased, and wage arrears decreased from 3.9 to 2.2 monthly wages. 
Specific Features of the Local Labor Markets 
The development of Kuzbas began after the end of World War II. Out of 224 
million tones of coal produced nationally in 1998, 94 million tones were mined in 
Kuzbas. The coal industry is presented by nine coal-producing regions with about 100 
mines and a great number of mining communities. The share of coal sector stands at 
38 % of the total industrial output. Coal enterprises are dispersed in remote areas 
away from industrial centers. This circumstance is usually credited with the existence 
of monopsony power in local labor markets. It can be speculated that in a mining 
community that offers employment only in coal production and is located far from 
industrial centers, external employment opportunities are scarce, which allows 
enterprises not to pay to their workers. However, a closer look reveals that the share 
of workers employed in a single enterprise does not exceed 5 % of total employment 
in a local labor market. The following situation is possible: aggregate demand in local 
labor market consists of only coal enterprises, but each individual enterprise does not 
have monopsony power in any local labor market. 
It is necessary to note that traditionally Kuzbas workers willingly go on strike 
and have influential trade unions, which suggests that coal workers have certain 
monopoly power in the labor market. 
3. Literature Review 
Theoretical Background  
As it has already been noted above, wage arrears have been extensively 
studied. There exist several viewpoints of the wage arrears incidence. 
1) "A theory of wage flexibility" - according to this theory, R. Layard and 
A. Richter (1995) suggest that wage arrears actually enable the reductions in 
wages without decreasing wages nominally. In short, wage arrears are a method 
to make wages more flexible.  
2) "A theory of the shortage of money" - S. Clarke (1997) suggests that the 
most important determinant for the scale of wage arrears is the proximity to cash 
sales, with the lowest delays being in the food and transport industries and in oil 
refining. He also states that the main reason for non-payment is not the willful 
negligence or corruption of managers and officials, but the lack of funds. In this 
view, the shortage of liquidity in enterprises is stressed. 
3) "A theory of the crime of finance and politics" - V. Gimpelson (1998) indicates 
that the major determinants of all types of arrears is to be sought in incomplete 
fiscal adjustment and lack of the political will to ensure financial discipline. To 
some extent, Alfandari and Schaffer (1996) present similar arguments. They 
assume that enterprises use arrears to obtain tax breaks and other privileges from the 
government.  
4) "A theory of dependence on regions". J. Earle and K. Sabirianova show in their 
empirical study that wage arrears have regional characteristics. They conclude 
that the degree to which firms use arrears is negatively related to performance 
measures for firms and regions, as well as liquidity, forms of private ownership 
and recent founding date of the firm, and positively related to concentration in 
local labor markets. Lehmann (Lehman., at al 1998)  suggests that large regional 
variation of wage arrears depend on the industrial structure, extent market 
transformation and regional government relationship with the center. 
 
 
 4. Setting the Hypotheses 
 Our study is based on the conclusion made by Alfandari and Schaffer (1996). 
The later paper examines non-payments, including wage arrears, and assumes that the 
nature of wage arrears is similar to the nature of non-payments to government budgets 
and other economic agents. The authors relate the existence of all kind non-payments 
to financial instability of enterprises. At the same time they note that managers of 
enterprises tend not to pay wages to a larger extent than to the government or other 
economic agents, ceteris paribus.  
 The fact that the dynamics of wage arrears is different from the 
dynamics of other non-payments, noted by Alfandari and Schaffer, deserves 
explanation. We believe that higher and more systematic wage arrears compared to 
other non-payments is associated with two circumstances in Russian economy. First, 
during crisis enterprises in the face decrease of demand   make efforts to decrease 
their wage costs using most available means. Second, underdeveloped regional labor 
markets do allow enterprises to decrease their costs by not paying wages to their own 
employees. Low mobility of labor force, high unemployment thereby failure external 
opportunities employments make it convenient for enterprises to use wage arrears as 
means of cutting their expenses. Nature of wage arrears bound up with practice when 
withholding wage payments became encourage management strategy. The working 
paper (Earl, Sabirianova, 2000) devotes to analysis this appearance. The authors 
provided evidence that higher wage arrears in the local labor market attenuate 
worker’s feedback state in his/her morale and effort, the quit probability, the strike 
probability and the probability that a legal penalty will be assessed.  Furthermore, the 
analysis provided evidence of positive relation between the manager’s strategy delay 
wage and the behavior of other firms operating in the same local labor market. 
Therefore, we can name two groups of factors that affect the occurrence of wage 
arrears in enterprises:  
1) factors, related to economic behavior of enterprises;  
2) factors, related to conditions of local labor markets. We need to analyze the 
influence of these factors more closely. 
From the economic theory, the first thing to be considered among the factors 
influencing the incidence of wage arrears is the reduction and restructuring of demand 
for the output of coal enterprises. Empirically, Alfandari and Schaffer, who found the 
connection between the demand and arrears, confirmed this relation: the later seemed 
to be concentrated in enterprises that experience reduction in demand. The fall in the 
output causes contraction in the demand for the products used in the generation of 
energy, although to a lesser degree than might be expected. A more sensitive to 
reduction is the share of “cash” in shipment contracts, which characterizes the general 
level of liquidity in the region. While payables for enterprises are associated with 
demand and can be paid in different ways, including cash, barter and mutual offsets, 
wages are more difficult to pay with non-cash methods. That is why the share of cash 
in contracts obviously determines the level of wage payments.  
An empirical evidence of mutual dependence between wage arrears and the 
level of liquidity in the region is given by the work of Earle and Sabirianova (1998).  
In order to measure bank liquidity in the region, authors made a survey of the time 
interval that is needed to receive an equivalent of $ 200 in cash in local bank They 
define bank liquidity as a dummy variable equal to one if the money could be 
withdrawn immediately. For measure oblast-level liquidity was taken a few measures: 
foreign currency turnover, retail triad turnover, bank credit per capita.  Alfandari and 
Schaffer to examined liquidity in the light of firm’s performance and measure 
liquidity as the value of monetary reserves (cash and bank deposits). The authors 
found a significant negative relation between the state of monetary reserves and non-
payments by enterprises. Because of the specific features of coal enterprises, we 
measure the degree of liquidity through monetary assets of enterprises in electric 
energy sector. The analysis of receivables of coal enterprises shows that 46 % are 
associated with electric power generating plants. In the chain for the market of electric 
power – consumers, producers and input suppliers – coal enterprises are the last. 
According to this chain, they are paid last. As a result, wage arrears of coal enterprises 
depend on effective demand for heat and electric power. 
 While demand restrictions increase the probability of the occurrence of 
arrears, no definite conclusion is drawn about the effect of financial state of the 
enterprise. Alfandari and Schaffer do not find any relation between arrears and 
financial conditions, measured by the difference between assets and liabilities. 
Nevertheless, we should expect a connection between financial success of the 
enterprise and its strategy to pay wages on time. Alfandari and Schaffer point to this 
conclusion by showing that wage arrears concentrate in enterprises with low wages 
(most likely, least effective).  
Efficiency of an enterprise is connected to the dynamics of overdue payments. 
The paper (Alfandari and Schaffer, 1996) propose a hypothesis that magnitude of 
wage arrears account for negotiations between the enterprise and the government, in 
which payments of wage arrears are tied to payments of tax arrears, and wage arrears 
are used as a pressure tool to receive tax breaks. Neither paper tests this hypothesis 
empirically. We analyze this hypothesis by checking whether the reduction in tax 
arrears takes place when wage arrears are high. 
 In our opinion, efficiency of an enterprise measured by its profitability 
should be related to wage arrears. Theoretically, coal enterprises maximize profits. 
They want their employees to be efficient and therefore, tend to pay on time and 
better wages. At the same time, enterprises under bankruptcy procedures or in the 
state of financial distress might not have any arrears (Gimpelson and Lippoldt, 1996, 
Alfandari and Schaffer, 1996). We assume that privatized enterprises operate in the 
framework of the traditional economic paradigm and maximize their profits. 
Therefore, this type of enterprises, compared to government owned enterprises, tends 
to be more efficient and pay wages on time in order to create efficiency incentives for 
their employees. Lehmann (Lehman., at al 1998) had assigned that  incident of arrears 
lower in the new private sector. At once in the region outside Moscow, the level 
withhold wages in the private firms is much higher.  Earle and Sabirianova (1998) 
also notice that regional variation may be more important then firm variation for 
understanding wage arrears.  Researchers connected the high levels regional variation 
of wage arrears with conditions in a local labor market. Lehmann at al (Lehman., at al 
1998) measuring  regional variation in basis regional level data ( in analysis involve 7 
large regions and capital). Earl, Sabirianova (1998) used more detailed data set (40 
raionov involving in RLMS). The effect conditions of a local labor market on wage 
arrears depend on worker’s outside options limited relocation cost. Thereby labor 
market of city or raion taken as local, which define some number measures.  They 
include general characteristics of regional labor market that people use when 
evaluating advantages or disadvantages of their job (unemployment, average regional 
wage). High average wage in the region implies availability of outside options for the 
workers, while high regional unemployment make them more tolerant to non- 
payments on their current job. 
 Earle and Sabirianova (2000) had suggested a model of managerial choice in 
result it to adopt decision withhold wages. They show, that level of wage arrears in 
the enterprise is relating to the incidence delays on the other firm operation in the 
same labor market. Pursuance this model, we assume regard wage arrears as key 
measure conditions of the regional labor market.  
5. The Data 
The majority of empirical studies of wage arrears is based on household 
survey databases (RLMS, RIFS), and on some additional data from Goskomstat. The 
work by Alfandari and Schaffer (1996) differs from most works because it utilizes 
mainly official aggregated statistical information of Goskomstat and World Bank 
survey of business activity of Russian enterprises. Our study is based on 
disaggregated data obtained from Kemerovo region statistical office. The official 
statistics on wage arrears published by the Russian Goskomstat are not quite 
satisfactory. They contain only aggregate data on accumulated arrears in different 
sectors of the economy. At the same time, regional statistical offices collect all 
enterprise-level data from the region in a form of current statistical records, and 
aggregate indicators are based on these data. Our data sources include balance-sheets 
of enterprises; reporting forms of statistical records – “labor and wages,” “profits,” 
“payables;” handbooks on social and economic conditions of Kuzbas region. 
Regional-level data are collected in complete count, on all enterprises of coal 
industry. 
We have a panel of data covering 1996, 1997 and 1998 for 103 firms of 
Kuzbas coal industry. Because of the purpose of our analysis we choose enterprises 
directly engaged in coal production. Since coal industry has been under the process of 
restructuring, there has been a group of firms that were closed during the period of 
observation, or are going to be closed. Enterprises that are being closed are losing the 
number of workers, which leads to growth in arrears per employee. These firms were 
excluded from the analysis. We also excluded new enterprises that started their 
activity in 1997-1998 since the number of their employees has also been unstable. As 
a result, we include in our analysis 70 enterprises that were stable during the period of 
study. The share of coal extraction in these enterprises amounts to 94 % of the total 
coal extraction in Kuzbass region in 1998.  
For each enterprise we collect data on wage arrears at the end of the month, 
volume of the shipped product, the number of employees, pre-tax profit, wage fund 
and some other variables. All money indicators are expressed in thousand roubles 
(deflated to roubles of January 1996 through regional consumer price indices). The 
existing system of accounting is a sufficiently reliable source of the statistics on labor 
and wages, as well as physical indicators. Financial indicators of efficiency such as 
profits, contain a “shadow” (measurement error) component. Because of the current 
pricing and financing mechanisms, firms have incentives to under-report their 
efficiency by exaggerating prime costs of production. If we assume that this “shadow” 
component is a fixed or slowly changing condition in enterprises activity, we can still 
use financial data to measure relative efficiency 
6. The Variables 
6.1. Measurement of Wage Arrears 
In statistical records, wage arrears appear as “stale debt at the beginning of 
month” and is measured as totals, that is, arrears incurred in the past plus their 
increase for the month. The current wage arrears already assessed and entered in the 
wage fund but not yet paid are not included in this indicator. If the enterprise pays 
wages in full during the reporting month, there is no increase in arrears. Arrears have 
to be paid in addition to the current payroll. Since the wage fund is associated with the 
number of employees and average wage, then the division of the arrears by wage fund 
scales the dependent variable concurrently to the number of employees and average 
wage. It seems more reasonable to include in our model the dependent variable 
measured as scaled arrears. The average wage in this case can be considered as one of 
the explanatory variables. 
The main variable used to measure wage arrears is constructed according to 
the following formula: 
Scaled stock of arrears: 
t
t
t N
wa
AW =′   
where  wa t is accumulated  wage arrears at the end of month t; 
N t is the number of employees in the same period. 
To use devoted to employees wage arrears we be able analyze stock wage 
arrears in enterprises.    
 We include another variable in the model. In our view, of a special scholarly 
interest is to answer the question: What criteria do enterprise managers use when 
deciding not to pay wages in the current month? We can’t answer in this question 
using as variable scaled stock wage arrears.   Three scenarios of enterprise behavior 
are possible: 1 – arrears unchanged, 2 – arrears increase, 3 – arrears decrease. Since 
the number of employees, as well as wage rates, is changing, we do not have any 
observations with unchanged arrears. Therefore, we can measure changes in arrears 
through a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if debt increased, and 0 if wage 
debt decreased. The wage debt measured in this way will, in our view, reveal the 
relationship between the enterprise performance and the making decision delay 
wages. 
 
6.2. Measurement of Factors Influencing the Incidence of Wage Arrears  
The total demand for the output of an enterprise is estimated by variable “total 
shipment” (SALE) that includes all forms of settlements for the products: barter, 
mutual offsets, bills, and cash payments. This indicator coincides with total sale of the 
primary product of enterprise activity (coal extraction). Realized output is more 
directed to the future compared to produced output and less predetermined by its pre-
history; besides, it is less prone to manipulations and more transparent for outside 
observers. We use total shipment per enterprise converted to “fixed” roubles by 
means of price indices.  
The data on the share of cash settlements are not present in realized sales. 
Since electric power generation is the main debtor of coal industry, we use variable 
wage arrears in electric power production (NONLIQUID) to estimate cash effective 
demand. Following Clarke (1997) we presume that the reason for wage arrears is the 
lack of “cash” funds in the enterprise. 
This variable is estimated as 
t
t
t N
wae
NONLIQUID = ,  
where  twae  is arrears in electric power generation in Kuzbas as a whole in 
period t;  
Nt is the number of employees in electric power generation in Kuzbas as a 
whole. 
We measure enterprise performance by variable profit/loss per employee 
(PROFIT). As in the Russian context taxes are often changed, we use pre-tax profit 
and deliberately use the balance-sheet profit (in contrast to profit from primary 
activity) in order to include the outcome of entrepreneurial risks of enterprise 
managers.  
Non-payments to government budgets are measured by the balance-sheet 
indicator – overdue payments to budgets of all levels (PAYABLE).  
Opportunities of the regional labor markets are measured through average 
wage in the city (WCITY) and average wage arrears in the raion (WACITY). 
Observed enterprises sit either in the city or raion of Kemerovskay oblast. We 
regard city or raion as the local labor market. The city and raion statistical records 
about wage arrears and average wages are using as WCITY and WACITY variables. 
Data observed on enterprises don’t use for contraction variables WCITY and 
WACITY.   For contraction this variables we divided city and raion statistical records   
by   employment in economics city or raion. 
In order to capture institutional effects of private ownership, which is expected 
to stimulate efficiency, we include variable private ownership of enterprise 
(OWNERSHIP) among the explanatory variables for wage arrears. In our sample, 
enterprises of four forms of ownership are present: full private ownership, full 
government ownership, partial foreign ownership (two enterprises) and mixed 
ownership (with participation of the state). Many enterprises with mixed ownership 
are de facto owned privately since the shares that belong to the state were given to 
private co-owners in temporary management. Therefore, not only fully private 
enterprises, but also enterprises with mixed property are likely to experience 
institutional effects of private property.  
Our work uses assumptions listed above and a unique dataset on 70 coal 
enterprises in Kuzbas to test the following hypotheses:  
 1. Wage arrears are negatively related to the level of demand for coal. If the data 
support this hypothesis, it would confirm the widespread view that wage non-
payments are connected to demand restrictions.  
2. The share of cash compensation in total sales is related to the problem of wage 
arrears, which means that wage arrears have negative relation to the level of liquidity 
in the region or positive relation to the level non-liquidity. 
3. Wage arrears are affected by efficiency of the enterprise. Relatively more profitable 
enterprises are expected to have lower probability of wage arrears. Here we also 
check the result of Alfandari and Schaffer that wage arrears are concentrated in 
enterprises that have relatively lower wages.  
4. Since privately owned enterprises maximize profits, they have more incentives to 
stimulate efficiency of their employees, and therefore, the probability of wage arrears 
in private enterprises should be lower than in enterprises of other ownership types. 
5. We expect that wage arrears more frequently occur in enterprises that attempt to 
reduce their arrears to government budgets. Even if we find empirical support for this 
hypothesis, we will not be able to conclude that wage non-payments serve as means 
of cutting other tax arrears. However, it will become clear that tax arrears and wage 
arrears compete with each other when enterprise managers make their decisions on 
payments.  
6. Wage arrears for a particular enterprise depend on the conditions of local labor 
markets. We expect that growth in average wage level in the region is negatively 
related to wage arrears in enterprises, while growth in average wage arrears in the 
region is positively related to wage arrears in each individual enterprise. 
7. Lastly, we test whether factors that determine the existence of wage arrears differ 
from the factors that determine the persistence of wage arrears and define enterprises 
that are chronic non-payers of wages. 
7. Modeling Wage Arrears 
7.1 Model Specifications 
              We use the set of panel data on coal enterprises of Kuzbas. The 
analysis of panel data is one of the most fruitful and innovative directions in the 
econometrics literature. As was noted by Greene (1995), a combination of   time-
series and cross-section data enables examination of issues that cannot be studied 
separately either in cross-sectional, or time series samples. Panel data make it possible 
to model heterogeneity of groups and units typical for microeconomic data.  
We analyze our dataset from three directions using three different dependent 
variables. At first, we focus on the flow of wage arrears (least squares models). Then 
we use discrete choice models to estimate the probability of having wage arrears 
(logit and probit models), as well as the probability of having arrears of different 
severity (ordered probit).  
Linear Specifications  
We estimate flow wage arrears by using classical OLS model, and then, the 
model with fixed effects, where we assume that fixed effects capture specific 
characteristics of each enterprise. We test the validity of the fixed effect model by 
means of F-test for the hypothesis that fixed effects are jointly insignificant. We also 
compare models with fixed effects versus random effects through Hausman 
specification test. 
The model with fixed effects is as follows: 
ititiit Xy εβα ++=      (1) 
where y it – the dependent variable for enterprise i in period t; 
X it – the matrix of explanatory variables, excluding the intercept; 
iα  – fixed effect for enterprise i: a parameter that varies by enterprise but is 
constant over time; 
itε  – an error term: independent and identically distributed random variables 
with mean zero and variance 2εσ  .  
We estimate the following base specification of the model that explains the behavior 
of flow wage arrears: 
εββββ
ββββ
+++++
++++=
WCITYWACITYLIQUIDPAYABLE
SALEPROFITWAGEOWNERSHIPCONSWA
8765
4321
'
                      (2) 
where all variables are defined in Appendix B, Table B.1 
 
Discrete Choice Specifications 
In order to estimate the influence of different factors on the probability of 
having wage arrears, we use binary choice models. The choice is the decision of the 
enterprise whether to pay or not to pay wages in the current period. Generally this 
choice is a random variable described by the following conditional probability, where 
xi is a vector of explanatory variables, and β is a vector of unknown parameters: 
{ } ( )β'1 iii xGxyP ==  , 
Obviously, function G (.) should be bounded by 0 and 1 to represent probability. If we 
assume that G (.) is a cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution, 
then we have the probit model: 
( ) ( ) dttwwG w 


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2
2
1exp
2
1
π  , 
Alternatively, we can assume that G (.) is a logistic distribution, which results in the 
logit model: 
( ) ( ) w
w
e
ewLwG +== 1  , 
Parameter estimates for β, obtained from probit or logit models, cannot be 
interpreted directly apart from their sign. In order to do such interpretations and 
compare the effects of different explanatory variables, we derive their marginal 
effects. Following the standard practice, when calculating numerical values for the 
marginal effects, we evaluate them at the sample means of the explanatory variables 
xi..  
The formulas for the marginal effects follow (Verbeek, 2000, p.314): 
Probit:  
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Our dataset allows us to work with model estimated both quarterly and 
monthly information. In the case OLS regression and fixed effect model we must get 
the same results. We may conjecture merely that model estimated on monthly data 
will be more exactly as we deal with greatest data. In the case probit model we have 
quality difference between monthly and quarterly models. Because quarterly dummy 
as measures of probability wage arrears will be average beside monthly dummy. 
Accordingly we will use both monthly and quarterly data considering particularity 
constriction dependent variable.  
Under analysis economic measures is appear question about influence time on 
this measures. We estimated model included monthly and quarterly dummy towards 
control influence of time. Estimate model reveal that time variable do not affect on 
wage arrears in condition our models ( F-statistic attached in table C-1).  
7.2 Estimation Results 
Linear Models 
Columns two and three of Table C-1, Appendix 3, present OLS estimates of 
the parameters for the model with wage arrears flow as the dependent variable. These 
results give preliminary support for most hypotheses proposed in this project. There is 
a negative relationship between wage arrears and the following factors: private 
ownership, the enterprise wage level, its profitability, and demand for the output of 
the enterprise. Tax arrears of the enterprise have positive effect on its wage arrears. 
Since the level of tax arrears of Russian enterprises is comparable to tax arrears of 
other transitional economies, we can interpret empirical correlation between wage 
payments and tax payments as an indirect evidence that enterprise use wage arrears to 
pressure government structures to receive tax breaks. 
Regional liquidity turns out to be a statistically significant factor in the model 
that uses monthly data and has positive effect on wage arrears. This was expected 
since high wage arrears in electric power generation and low level of liquidity of this 
coal-consuming industry causes liquidity problems and wage arrears in coal industry.  
Regional average wage arrears and regional average wage level have positive 
effect on wage arrears in coal enterprises. The sign on the parameter for regional 
wage level is unexpected since we hypothesized earlier that high wages in the region 
improve external opportunities of enterprise employees and decrease the ability of the 
enterprises to underpay wages. This unexpected empirical result could be caused by 
measurement problems in the variable “regional average wage” that was taken from 
statistical reports on social and economic conditions in Kemerovo region and is 
calculated as an aggregate indicator, thus the method of its calculation in the reports 
could be inconsistent with the method used for our enterprise-level data on wage 
arrears. 
We conduct Ramsey specification test for the OLS models. We fail to reject 
the hypothesis of incorrect specification and omitted variables for both datasets – with 
quarterly and monthly data. Therefore, we need to refine the model, which we do by 
utilizing the panel nature of our dataset and estimate specifications with enterprise-
specific effects. 
Columns four and five of Table C-1 contain estimation results for the model 
with fixed enterprise-specific effects. We also estimated the model specification of 
random effects, but found no systematic evidence between the two specifications 
(Hausman test). At the same time, the F-test for joint significance of the estimates for 
fixed effects indicates that jointly, fixed effects are significantly different from zero. 
Parameter estimates for the models with fixed effects are similar in sign to the 
parameter estimates of the OLS models and support most of the proposed hypotheses 
(except for our hypothesis on the sign for the effect of regional wage). High profits, 
high level of  sales and high wages in the enterprise tend to lower wage arrears. It is 
worth noting that the factor that has most pronounced positive effect on wage arrears 
is regional level of wage arrears, while private ownership has most pronounced 
negative influence.  
Discrete Choice Models 
Table C-2 presents estimation results for the probit model with random effects.  
The best result provides evidence for our hypotheses, we get estimated the 
quarterly data model. In our view it is connected with current practice when manager 
look about the result of work within quarter making strategy of management.  
Marginal effects, listed in columns three and five, represent the effect of each 
explanatory variable on the probability of having wage arrears, ceteris paribus. Since 
all explanatory variables are evaluated at their sample means, the marginal effects are 
measured as percentage point deviations from the sample mean. 
The obtained parameter estimates suggest that factors internal to the enterprise 
economy – output demand, wage levels in the enterprise and ownership type – are the 
main determinants for the occurrence of wage arrears. At the same time, factors that 
characterize external conditions – regional labor market – are statistically 
insignificant. These results indicate that enterprises decide not to pay wages when 
they experience financial difficulties. Institutional factors also affect the decision to 
withhold wages: private ownership decreases the probability of wage non-payments 
by 10 percentage points (in the model with quarterly data). 
Note that variable on profits/losses is insignificant in both versions of the 
models – with monthly and quarterly data, while the coefficient on enterprise wage 
level is negative in both models, and significant in the second model. In addition, 
enterprise wage has the second highest marginal effect (after ownership).  
High sensitivity of wage arrears in an enterprise to its wage level can be 
explained in terms of economic incentives: enterprises that pay higher wages try to 
stimulate efficiency among their employees. There exist enterprises that do not value 
the efficiency of their employees as much – these could be enterprises that receive 
government subsidies or belong to a multi-industry holding company that cross-
subsidizes its operations in coal industry from coal export or other industries. It is 
unclear whether these enterprises maximize profits, operate to “stay alive” or simply 
maintain their historical level of production while facing the deficit of funds. This 
question remains to be answered, though it is clear that the answer is closely related to 
the problem of wage arrears. Traditional measures of economic performance become 
only weakly related to actual competitiveness of an enterprise when enterprises act 
under the conditions of economic crisis and fast changes in the “rules of economic 
game.” This circumstance, in our opinion, explains the conclusion of Alfandari and 
Schaffer that financial problems of an enterprise are not related to wage arrears. It 
also explains our result that enterprises do not use profit in their decision-making on 
whether to withhold wage or not.  
As opposed to the efficiency variables, output demand has significant effect on 
the incidence of wage arrears in all models. It is interesting to note that marginal 
effects of variable “wage in the enterprise” (employees’ incentives for efficient work) 
and private ownership of the enterprise are higher in absolute value than the effect of 
the output demand. Top management of Russian coal industry usually names unstable 
demand for coal and non-payments for shipped coal by electric energy sector as the 
main factors that drive wage arrears (Solomatin, 2000). Our study suggests that the 
propensity to withhold wage payments is dependent primarily on the type of 
ownership in this enterprise and the development of incentive schemes for enterprises. 
The last question studied in this paper is as follows: What factors determine 
the degree of chronic nature of wage non-payments in enterprises?” We divide the 
enterprises in the sample into three groups by the severity of wage arrears problem 
and estimate ordered probit model. The parameter estimates are presented it Table C-
4.  
Estimation results are similar regardless of what dataset we use – monthly or 
quarterly level data. The results of the estimation supplement conclusions from the 
previous specifications. The degree of the chronic nature of wage arrears is sensitive 
to the level of wages in the enterprise and output demand. We confirm the result of 
the previous literature (Lehmann, et al, 1999, Earlе and Sabirianova, 2000) that 
regional wage levels are an important determinant of the chronic nature of wage non-
payments. Parameter estimates indicate that enterprises base their decisions of 
whether to withhold wages or not on the conditions of local labor markets. Developed 
regional labor markets and most importantly, employee mobility, can keep enterprises 
from withholding wages.  
 
Conclusions 
In conclusion we would like to stress one more time that despite certain 
improvements in overdue wage payments observed in the last two years, mechanisms 
that cause the incidence of wage arrears continue to exist. Enterprises still consider 
withholdings of wage payments as acceptable means of combating financial crisis.  
In this situation issues of wage arrears, particularly in the regions with certain 
social tensions such as Kuzbas, are frequently exploited by different interest groups to 
advocate their own agenda. For example, there exist a widely spread opinion among 
the opponents of privatization that one of the reasons for wage non-payments in coal 
industry is that coal enterprises, which gained the ability to make their own decisions 
as a result of market reforms, offer wages that are unreasonably high. Our study 
indicates that the data reject this hypothesis because high wage levels in an enterprise 
tend to be associated with lower incidence of wage arrears.  
The mains findings of our work are as follows. First, wage arrears in coal 
industry are determined to a large degree by institutional factors, rather than the 
output demand. These institutional factors include the type of ownership, as well as 
the incentives for the enterprises to increase efficiency of their employees, which is 
directly related to the general efficiency of the enterprise. This result suggests 
economic policies that should help eliminate wage arrears in the industry and social 
tensions associated with this problem. These policies involve institutional reforms that 
make the conditions of economic activity for the enterprises incentive-based and 
transparent. These reforms should be based on pro-active privatization of government 
property and stimuli for the development of private enterprises.  
Second, in the long-term, an enterprise that makes its decision to pay or 
withhold wages relies in this decision on the conditions of local labor markets. 
Therefore, we can suggest another direction for economic policy that should ease the 
problem of wage arrears and force enterprises to pay wages on time. This direction 
includes measures that develop local labor markets and increase mobility of labor 
force between enterprises and industries. 
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Structure energy coal production Russia
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Table А -1 
                         Showing Financial and Economic Activity of Coal Output in Kuzbas 
 
Showing  1996 1997 1998 
Coal output, million ton 93,9 92,1 97,2 
Labor productivity, ton  65,1 73,4 80,6 
Cost price of one ton, rubs. 135,1 134,6 123,0 
Prime Costs, rubs. 130,5 131,0 122,6 
Wages, rubs. 1505 1612 1661 
Notes payable, million rubs.  6991 7746 8064 
Bill payable, million rubs. 14511 19141 19841 
Stale payables to budget, million rubs.   3675 6670 6125 
including fine 906 2890 2325 
Wage arrears, million rubs..  933 1053 820 
Budgetary financing, million rubs.   2431 2020 1734 
including implementation of tariff deal  390 134 70 
measures  on closing unprofitable mines  270 356 416 
investment 1128 520 220 
selective support of loss-making enterprises  278 161 578 
 
 
Table А-2 
 
Wage Arrears Connected with Lack of Budgetary Financing 
From Budgets of All Levels, %, to total amount, 1998 
 
 Janu-
ary 
 
Feb-
ru-
ary 
Marc
h 
 
April Ma
y 
June July Au-
gust 
Sep-
tem-
ber 
Octo-
ber 
No-
vem-
ber 
De-
cem-
ber 
Share of non-
payments from 
budgets of all lev-
els 
 
1,34 1,04 0,97 1,06 0,69 0,74 0,48 0,69 0,796 1,14 1,39 1,399 
 
Table А-3 
 
                         Showing Economic Activity of Sample Firms in Kuzbas 
 
 
Year  
Number 
private 
firms 
Wage arrears in 
month wage 
bill 
 
Number prof-
itable firms  
Profit per  
employee, 
 thousand 
rubs 
Bill payable  
per employee, 
 thousand rubs  
Price of one 
ton, rubs 
96.12 10 2,9 26 9,2 13,0 146,1111 
97.12 10 3,5 24 8,7 23,7 149,2469 
98.12 19 3,8 29 11,4 46,8 173,8612 
99.12 26 2,3 31 30,5 119,1 422,3032 
 
APPENDIX В 
 
Table В-1 
 
List of regression variables 
 
1. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
All performance money measures are calculated in constant prices of January 1996. 
 
WA - wage arrears  
NONLOGIT 
 
- 1, if debt was increasing and 0 in absence of increase or if wage 
debt decreased  
 
2. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
OWNERSHIP - 1, fully private ownership and 0, if not 
PAYABLE - stale payables to budget per one employed 
PROFIT - profit/loss per one employed  
SALE - volume of sales per one employed  
WAGE - wage  
WCITY - average city (district) wage  
WACITY - average city (district ) wage arrears 
NONLIQUID - wage arrears in electric power production per one employed  
 
Table В-2 
Summary Tables of Statistics, 1996 г.  
 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
str 1308 0.0489297 0.2158035 0 1 
wa 1065 5.844212 10.23106 0.0234597 168.8619 
wam 975 5.460461 9.394862 0.0234597 168.8619 
priv 1308 0.1330275 .3397344 0 1 
kr 1166 15.87732 15.59546 0.2063482 199.2279 
profit 1180 -15.97534 118.864 -1594.841 107.5312 
w 1241 1.56445 0.792951 0.0626239 17.03515 
vso 1093 7.793608 8.321659 0.0195246 135.2878 
vd 1088 0.0547091 0.0494727 0.0007003 0.6172839 
nonluqid 1254 0.0113638 0.0120657 0.0001824 0.059176 
wcity 1308 1244.845 228.3241 678 1870.855 
wacity 1308 1.12645 0.5612579 0.0011367 5.183572 
waem 1199 4.364731 2.588052 0.3968254 8.737499 
unem 1308 2.438532 1.114877 0.6 4.9 
wae 1308 4.70392 2.722555 0.3968254 8.737499 
 
Table В-3 
 
Summary Tables of Statistics, 1998 г.  
 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
str 1140 .0570175 0.2319779 0 1 
wa 1044 13.08788 16.46982 0 273.6096 
wam 957 12.54889 15.25492 0 273.6096 
priv 1140 0,3368421 0,4728378 0 1 
kr 1034 64,80634 170,3769 0 4333,547 
profit 1036 -8,805924 88,37203 -1580 961,4073 
w 1007  2.609305 1.413113 0.0199324 12.33254 
vso 1060 11,53909 20,70029 0 541,7405 
vd 983 0,0701156 0,056683 0.0012019 0.5621622 
nonliquid 1060 .0384147 0,0388526 0.000162 0,1888917 
wcity 1140 1881.575 685.4101 820.5571 4682.167 
wacity 1140 7032.009 2576.831 1200.367 15441.67 
unem 1140  2.063158 1.038881 0.7 4.5 
share 1140  83.15236 6.41153 35.31157 91.33858 
wae 1140  7953.847 1096.464 6296.89 9778.003 
waem 1045 7788.015 990.6121 6296.89 9360.199 
 
Appendix C  
Table С-1. 
Determinants of Wage Arrears 
OLS and Fixed Effects Models. Dependent variable: flow wage arrears per employee.      
                                       
  
 
Monthly Quarterly Monthly Quarterly 
OLS OLS FE FE 
 
Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  
OWNERSHIP  -1.4073 (0.2496)*** -1.4948 (0.5067)*** -3.0573 (0.3735)*** -3.6203 (0.7887)*** 
WAGE -0.5894 (0.1319)*** -0.6534 (0.2098)*** -0.4701 (0.1141)*** -0.6182 (0.1859)*** 
PROFIT -0.0410 (0.0051)*** -0.0400 (0.0089)*** -0.0439 (0.0045)*** -0.0434 (0.0084)***  
SALE -0.1153(0.0054)*** -0.0989 (0.0299)*** -0.0846 (0.0159)*** -0.0629 (0.0310)* 
PAYABLE   0.0511(0.0054)***   0.0485 (0.0102)***   0.0396 (0.0054)***   0.0333 (0.0108)*** 
LIQUID     0.2154 (0.0622)***   0.0907 (0.1867)  0.2985 (0.0458)***   0.2419 (0.1490) 
WACITY    1.1928 (0.0668)***   1.2875 (0.1351)***  1.0613 (0.0607)***   1.2111 (0.1287)*** 
WCITY      0.0010 (0.00025)***   0.0015 (0.0005)***  0.0006 (0.0002)***   0.0011 (0.0004)** 
CONS   1.4863 (0.4895)***      1.9383 (1.2385)    1.761295(0.3636)***       1.7552  (0.9504) 
Nom (categories)   69 69 
Number of observations 2415 759 2415 759 
R-sq  (overall) 0.4780 0.4311 0.4639 0.4132 
Ramsey RESET test F(3,2403)=12.36;Prob>F=0.0000 F(3,747)=7.19;Prob>F=0.0006   
F –test, joint significant time 
dummy 
F(11,2403)=0.84; Prob>F=0.6745 F(3,747)=1.17; 
 Prob>F=0.3190 
  
Hausman  test   chi2(8)=6.98;Prob>chi2=0.5383 chi2(8)=5.91;Prob>chi2=0.6568 
F test that all u_i=0   F(68,2338)=33.36;Prob>F=0.000 F(68,682)=9.37;Prob>F=0.0000 
***Significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10%, standard error  in parentheses  
tAW ′
 
Table С-2 
Determinants of the Incidence of Wage Arrears 
Probit Random Effects Model. Dependent variable: Incidence of wage arrears. 
 
  
Monthly Quarterly 
Probit, RE Probit, RE  
 
Coefficient Marginal effect  Coefficient  Marginal effect 
OWNERSHIP  -0.2035 (0.0974) -0.0804  -0.7302 (0.3181)** -0.1056** 
WAGE -0.0044 (0.0420) -0.0017  -0.3283 (0.1108)***  -0.0475** 
PROFIT -0.0029 (0.0016) -0.0012  -0.0082 (0.0039) -0.0012 
SALE -0.0202(0.0052)*** -0.0079**  -0.0306(0.0132)** -0.0044** 
PAYABLE   -0.0021(0.0018) -0.0008    0.0017 (0.0066)  0.00025 
LIQUID     0.0309 (0.0173) 0.0122    0.0257 (0.0978) 0.0037 
WACITY    0.0433 (0.0215) 0.0171     0.1288 (0.0816) 0.0186 
WCITY      0.0001 (0.00007) 0.00003    0.0001(0.0002) 0.00003 
CONS   -0.0078 (0.1423)                    3.4505(0.7525)***  
Nom (categories) 69 69 
Number of observations 2415 759 
Wald test  Wald chi2(8)=48.92;Prob>chi2=0.0000 Wald chi2(8)=36.96;Prob>chi2=0.0000 
Log Likelihood -1586.5139 -145.06797 
***Significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10%, standard error  in parentheses  
Table С-3. 
Determinants of the Incidence of Wage Arrears  
Logit Fixed Effects Model. Dependent variable: Incidence of wage arrears. 
 
 
Monthly Quarterly 
Logit, FE Logit, FE  
 
Coefficient Marginal effect  Coefficient  Marginal effect 
OWNERSHIP  -0.5202 (0.2367) -0.1262  -0.4290 (0.4310)  -0.1048 
WAGE -0.0803 (0.0731) -0.0195  -0.1127 (0.1041)  -0.0276 
PROFIT -0.0055 (0.0028) -0.00136  -0.0086 (0.0048)  -0.0210 
SALE -0.0247(0.0103) -0.0059  -0.0325(0.0176)  -0.0079 
PAYABLE   -0.0051(0.0033) -0.0012  -0.0031 (0.0059)  -0.00076 
LIQUID     0.0675 (0.0285)** 0.0163**   -0.0955 (0.0854)  -0.0233 
WACITY    0.0309 (0.0382) 0.0075     0.1560 (0.0727)**   0.0382** 
WCITY      0.0001 (0.00007) 0.0001    0.0007(0.00002)***   0.00018*** 
Nom (categories) 69 68 
Number of observations 2415 748 
Wald test  Wald chi2(8)=26.43;Prob>chi2=0.0009 Wald chi2(8)=31.49;Prob>chi2=0.0001 
Log Likelihood -1378.5146 -328.6919 
***Significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10%, standard error  in parentheses  
